Kuebler: Response

of this mutual participation in physis simply as some
sort of ecological solidarity. Nor is it clear to what extent
this continuity between human and animal provides a
compelling basis for moral concern, nor what specific
moral choices would be implied.
There is a sense in which Heidegger's presentation
of human being in the world is still overly disembodied.
Heidegger is not concerned with how human history is
intertwined with ecological histories nor with the ways
in which ecological interactions (much less economic
and political interactions!) might inform the specific
ways in which we would dwell. And while it is true
that his earlier accounts of the structure of Dasein and
his later accounts of dwelling describe an embodied
existence, they are still notably abstract and cerebral.
Heidegger is concerned with death but not the
physicality of death; he is not concerned with human
existence as gendered existence; he is not concerned
with the sensual, fleshly experience of the body,
especially the experience of the body in pain.
This is, I think, where Heidegger falls short as a
source of help for animals, as well as for an interhuman
ethics. I agree with Foltz that Heidegger's analysis of
technology is valuable as a way of articulating what
is horrifying about practices of "factory farming," as
a way of naming the ontological violence that is
involved, and as a way of recognizing that factory
farming is part of a larger picture of how we relate
technologically to other beings. It may not be enough
to say that factory farming is wrong, but it is not
enough either to name the ontological horror of
technology without also naming suffering and
injustice. In a now notorious, unpublished essay on
technology from the late 1940's, Heidegger compared
agribusiness to the Holocaust:

brilliant but initially cold son Danny in silence, so that
in that silence, Danny might hear the pain of the world
and so learn compassion. People, animals, the very
earth cry out in pain. Such an awareness of the depths
of injustice and attunement to the suffering of the
world may provide the best and only hope, for the
animals and for us.

Errata
The following corrections are to Professor
Evelyn Pluhar's "Arguing Away Suffering: The
Neo-Cartesian Revival," which appeared in the
Winter 1993 number.
1. The last sentence of the text (p. 39) should
have been these two sentences instead:
"The ad hominem fallacy is indeed to be
avoided, but one cannot help wondering
if Descartes and his modem counterparts
would have argued as they did had they
not had such powerful incentives to deny
nonhuman suffering, ranging from
vivisection to theodicy. Most significant
of all, perhaps, is their shared vision of
human superiority, a vision that has nailed
many nonhlIDlans to the scientific cross."
2. The following note should have been
added to the very end of the text:
"My thanks to the Institute of Arts and
Humanistic Studies for funding a onecourse teaching release during the fall of
1992. This manuscript was written
during that time period."

Agriculture is now a motorized food industry,
in essence the same as the fabrication of
corpses in the gas chambers and concentration
camps, the same as the blockades which
starved out whole countries, the same as the
fabrication ofhydrogen bombs. (Schirmacher,

3. Footnote 43 (p. 40) should have read:
"He cites studies claiming, e.g., that opiates
affect "the psychological context" of the
brain rather ilian the nerve messages. We
now know that opiates work by releasing
neurotransmitters that bind with brain
receptors. Significantly, all vertebrates
share this physiological mechanism."

Technik und Gelassenheit, p. 25)
Horror at the ontological violence of technology is
not enough, and the potential for heedful concern and
respect in letting-be may be far too fragile and subject
to corruption. In Chaim Potok's novel The Chosen,
Reb Saunders makes the hard choice of raising his
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